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Building Governance Capacity: 
The Case of Potable Water in First 
Nations Communities
John Graham and Evlyn Fortier
Introduction
There is a near consensus among development experts, both in this country and 
abroad, that governance is a critical component in improving individual and 
community well-being.1 Not surprisingly, a growing number of organizations in 
Canada focus on building governance capacity of Aboriginal communities as a 
critical element of their mandate. Some of these organizations are run by Aborigi-
nal people. One of the newest is the recently constituted National Centre for First 
Nation Governance, which has a broad mission for stimulating improvements in 
Aboriginal governance. And there are many others—from training organizations 
to educational institutions to special purpose bodies like the National Aboriginal 
Health Organization.
Furthermore, many federal and provincial government departments would 
claim to be in the capacity-development business, with Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada as one of the most important players. Its capacity mandate is wide 
and includes implementing claims and self-government agreements; assisting 
First Nations in administering certain sections of the Indian Act; improving 
fi nancial management; and assisting communities and governments in the northern 
territories.
But despite the importance of governance and the prevalence of governance 
capacity building, there appears to be much confusion about what the term capacity 
building encompasses; what approaches are effective and in what circumstances; 
what are important preconditions for success; and what constraints exist for orga-
nizations funding capacity building approaches. 
The purpose of this paper is to help fi ll this knowledge gap. In the following, 
we present a model for capacity development that outlines the various approaches, 
goals, and considerations for strategies to develop capacity. We examine the 
advantages and disadvantages for each of the possible approaches. To illustrate 
this model, we apply it to a case study—potable water in First Nations commu-
nities. Finally, we conclude with “lessons learned” from the application of this 
model to the case study.
— 145 —
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What Is Capacity Building?
Among the acknowledged leaders in the fi eld of capacity development and building 
governance capacity is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Most 
recently, the UNDP has implemented a program called Capacity 2015 to build 
capacity at the local level through partnerships. The object of this program is to 
realize the Millenium Development Goals. The various initiatives of Capacity 
2015 are designed to support processes leading to increased incomes, and link 
local communities to the global economy.
The UNDP uses this defi nition for capacity development:
Capacity is the ability of individuals, organizations and societies to perform functions, 
solve problems, and set and achieve goals. Capacity Development (CD) entails the 
sustainable creation, utilization and retention of that capacity, in order to reduce poverty, 
enhance self-reliance, and improve people’s lives.2 
This defi nition has considerable merit. It puts the emphasis on ultimate objec-
tives—improving well-being—and contains the notion of sustainability as critical 
to capacity building. Nonetheless, the very breadth of the defi nition is challeng-
ing in that it could encompass anything from training a single individual to a 
massive project, such as introducing the rule of law into China, an exercise that 
one commentator has called “one of the largest social infrastructure projects in the 
history of mankind.”3 
International Experience
The next question to consider is what has been the experience internationally 
in building governance capacity. This has been an important priority of many 
international development agencies, including the World Bank. Every year the 
World Bank publishes a document called “Governance Matters.” In May 2005, 
their document “Governance Matters IV” looked at governance indicators in 209 
countries.4 The salient conclusions of this paper include the following:
Wealth is not a precondition of good governance.
The most important causal relationship is good governance leading to 
good outcomes.
Corruption is of critical importance to society’s investment climate.
Relatively rapid improvement in governance is rare but possible.
The worldwide average of a host of good governance indicators has not 
improved over the past eight years, despite signifi cant investments from 
aid agencies.
“The importance of political commitment from the top has been 
underplayed …”
These conclusions contain much that is encouraging, but also much that is 
worrisome. The fact that wealth is not a precondition for good governance is good 
•
•
•
•
•
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news, given the need for good governance in countries with poor economic condi-
tions. The causal relationship is actually the other way—that is, good governance 
leads to improved outcomes in the form of economic and social well-being.
However, the fact that rapid improvement is rare but possible sounds a 
cautionary note. Furthermore, the fact that the worldwide average of good gover-
nance indicators has not improved over the past eight years, despite substantial 
investments, is discouraging to say the least. And the last bullet points to one 
reason for the lack of progress—that is, the need for political commitment from 
the top as a necessary precondition for realizing progress in improving gover-
nance.
The conclusions of this World Bank report are signifi cant for the case study 
that follows.
Developing a Capacity Building Plan
The following model is adapted from a similar analytical tool developed by the 
UNDP: 
Several aspects of this model deserve further elaboration. One of its critical 
elements is the gap analysis between “where we are now” and “where we want 
to be.” This paper will not address various approaches for undertaking this gap 
analysis. Suffi ce it to say that this is a complex undertaking meriting a paper in its 
?
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own right. That said, the Institute has developed several tools for effecting such an 
analysis and these tools are built on good governance principles.5
The sustainability part of the model is also very important. Sustainability will 
fi gure prominently in the case study featured in the latter part of this paper.
Finally, the gap analysis situates the issue as a matter involving individuals, 
organizations, or systems. This tripartite view of building capacity allows analysis 
of the three approaches, the strategies and techniques for each, and their advan-
tages and disadvantages. And it is to this that we now turn.
Individuals
A common approach to capacity building focuses on individuals. That is, the 
critical issue from this perspective is developing the skills, knowledge, and values 
of individual people, and giving them the tools to do their jobs. Indeed, for many, 
capacity development boils down simply to training.
Even from within the confi nes of individual approaches to capacity building 
there is a richer array of approaches than just training. For example, establishing 
a professional association is a common strategy among a wide range of public 
service disciplines. For First Nations, there are more and more professional 
associations being set up, such as associations of fi nancial offi cers, economic 
development offi cers, and water operators. Other strategies include establishing 
certifi cation requirements, changing incentives such as pay and recognition, and 
providing better tools such as computers.
Using the approach of focusing on individuals is popular with funders. There 
are advantages such as low cost, quick and measurable results, low political risk, 
and well-defi ned roles for funders. However, the disadvantages are also compel-
ling. Governance capacity issues are seldom confi ned to individuals, and sustain-
ability is an issue when using these strategies. In short, despite the fact that this 
approach involves low risk, it also involves low reward.
Organizational
A second approach to capacity building concentrates on the organization. 
According to the rationale for this approach, improvement in the organization 
is required because it lacks a clear mission, has poor morale, lacks policies, has 
poorly defi ned roles and so on. In the case used as an example below, the organi-
zation could be the First Nations public works function, including the Chief and 
Council, and staff.
Strategies and techniques for this approach are well known. One strategy uses 
an “outsider” to conduct a policy or program review or study. Another involves 
leadership change. Certifi cation for the organization is a third technique, which 
is relevant for First Nations issues. For example, the Membertou First Nation has 
an ISO certifi cation and the Institute on Governance has advocated such a system 
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for improving fi nancial management.6 Furthermore, the First Nations Fiscal and 
Statistical Management Act sets up a First Nations-run certifi cation scheme for 
First Nations interested in property tax and borrowing, using the income stream 
from property taxes as collateral. Other strategies for the organizational approach 
involve organizational development workshops, and twinning with an outside 
organization.
There are a number of advantages to focusing on the organization. Building 
capacity at the organizational level is more likely to address underlying gover-
nance issues. There are potentially high payoffs to such an approach. Finally, 
if the organization is improved, this can provide incentives for individual skill 
building. For example, an ISO certifi cation will require using certifi ed individuals 
for certain functions in order to maintain certifi cation. This provides an ongoing 
incentive for individual capacity building. 
However, the disadvantages need to be considered. Focusing on the organiza-
tion can involve higher costs and longer timetables. There is uncertainty about 
how long these exercises will take, and their status when they end. Furthermore, 
an organizational approach is riskier in that it might imply change to the existing 
power structures. And sustainability is an issue. Leadership change, for example, 
can set the organization backward dramatically. 
Finally, the funders’ role becomes more problematic because projects focusing 
on the organization start to change power relationships and this presents problems 
for public servants or NGO offi cials wary of getting involved in community or 
organizational politics. 
System-wide
The last category involves a system-wide approach. In this case, the focus is on 
relationships among organizations in a system. So, for example, in a First Nations 
context, we would examine the set of relationships the First Nation would have 
with other governments—federal, provincial, municipal—and with other organi-
zations such as Tribal Councils, service organizations, etc. 
The issues prompting a system-wide approach could include poor legal or regu-
latory systems, inadequate system resources, poor relationships among players, 
and so on. To tackle these issues, capacity-building strategies might implement 
new or enhanced regulatory systems, new coordinating machinery and agree-
ments, or dispute resolution systems. The Social Union Framework Agreement 
(SUFA)7 is an example of new coordinating machinery and agreements struck 
between the federal and provincial/territorial governments. Another strategy might 
employ adding more resources to the system, and there have been many examples 
of this technique. A fi nal technique uses system-wide review and advocacy. A 
Royal Commission, such as the Romanow Commission, is an example of such 
an approach.
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There are potential benefi ts, but also potential costs, to a focus on a governance 
system. One advantage is that this is the only sustainable strategy, assuming a 
gap analysis identifying system-wide problems is correct. There are also high 
potential payoffs in the long term. Furthermore, a system-wide approach can 
provide incentives for organizational and individual approaches. For example, 
the Navajo in the United States, with a population of 140,000 on a reservation the 
size of West Virginia, embarked on an eight-year plan to build their own Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) with the help of the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. This plan involves a system-wide focus that stimulates incentives 
for tribal organizations to conform to environmental regulations and individuals 
to become properly qualifi ed to perform certain functions.
However, there is an important precondition in that a system-wide approach 
requires a high degree of political commitment from all of the critical players 
involved. The disadvantages include high cost, and the fact that a system-wide 
approach is time consuming and high risk. Money alone may not solve the 
problems, and there is an increasingly uncertain role for funders. 
In sum, system-wide approaches involve potentially substantive changes in 
power relationships and long-term commitments with uncertain outcomes. For 
these reasons, they tend not to be favoured by funders.
Considerations—A Look Back at the World Bank 
Findings
The above analysis of the three approaches to capacity building helps illuminate 
the World Bank’s gloomy fi ndings. One of these was that rapid change is rare, and 
we can see why. System-wide changes—those with the biggest impact and poten-
tially the most sustainable results—are premised on political commitment and 
moreover take considerable time. Furthermore, the long time frames and uncertain 
results present signifi cant problems for funding agencies. Demon strating results, 
especially in the short term, is not likely possible.
An example of a system-wide approach illustrates the dilemmas involved. 
Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian economist, notes that developing countries are 
much richer than we give them credit for, but they suffer from what he calls “dead 
capital” because of the lack of a land registry system. Thus, in these developing 
countries, fi nancial institutions have no way of taking property as collateral to 
fi nance small business loans, because of the lack of a registry. But small business 
loans are the most important source of capital for small businesses. Thus putting 
in place a land registry system in a country like Egypt can be crucial for economic 
development by leveraging the country’s considerable housing capital. Nonethe-
less it’s an undertaking that can take decades. Just imagine the number of land 
disputes involving such matters as ownership and land boundaries in a city as 
complicated as Cairo! 
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This and other examples of system-wide changes are important reminders that 
too often, citizens of fi rst world countries take complex governance systems for 
granted. These systems function below the radar screen unless something drastic 
goes wrong, as in the case of Walkerton, Ontario. However, when they are not in 
place, a country or society faces formidable challenges to build them.
The following case study will explore this theme in more depth.
Case Study—Safe Water in First Nation 
Communities
The model developed in the previous section can be applied to a pressing 
problem—safe drinking water on First Nations reserves. A large number of First 
Nations reserves have poor quality drinking water, a fact that is now well under-
stood. In March 2006, over 10% of First Nations communities (79 of the 755 
community water systems identifi ed by the Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs on reserves across Canada) faced boil water advisories. Furthermore, 193 
water systems were identifi ed as high risk, 312 as medium risk and 250 as low 
risk.8
The gap analysis for this situation reveals problems at all three levels. 
Individual: many water operators on reserves are uncertifi ed; some 
leaders lack knowledge and commitment
Organizational: some water plants on reserves are not well maintained; 
water systems suffer from early rust-out; community budgeting issues 
sometimes restrict the ability to address problems
System-wide: there are unclear standards for water quality on reserves; 
inspections are insuffi cient; enforcement of standards is limited; 
resources are insuffi cient; there are few communities with user fees 
despite the requirement for such in agreements with INAC. Such fees 
might help curb consumption and provide a source of additional funding 
for maintenance; and roles of the key players are poorly defi ned. 
The story of water problems at the Kashechewan reserve brought the issue 
of unsafe water in First Nations communities to national prominence late in 
2005, but the issue has had a long history. Following the outbreaks of water-
borne illnesses at Walkerton in 2000 and North Battleford in 2001, the federal 
government announced a seven-point strategy with elements aimed at individuals 
(primarily training and certifi cation of operators); organizations (more funds and 
other approaches to encourage better maintenance); and some system-wide defi -
ciencies (e.g., attempts to introduce standards and enforcement measures). 
In March of 2006, the new Conservative government announced a fi ve-point 
plan to tackle water issues on reserves, a plan that in many ways repackaged the 
former government’s seven-point strategy but with one signifi cant difference: it 
made a commitment for a legislated regulatory system. 
•
•
•
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It is worth examining the elements of the seven-point strategy (“Strategy 7”) 
and fi ve-point plan (“Plan 5”) in more detail.
Individual Approaches
One important part of both Strategy 7 and Plan 5 is aimed at water operators. 
That is, they both include a program to train and certify operators. The program 
has provided circuit rider training in all areas of Canada, training that originated 
in Ontario with the Ontario First Nations Technical Services Corporation. Efforts 
have also been directed at educational materials for the Chiefs, Councils, and 
members. Public education efforts have also begun in certain regions.
The most signifi cant issue for this approach involves problems around certifi -
cation. The original objective was to have 100% of operators certifi ed by 2006. 
This objective has been restated by the current government.
However, the 100% certifi cation target is unattainable, assuming that the 
approach is to recruit and train members of First Nation communities. Why is this 
so? The answer relates to the stringent education and experience requirements, 
along with certifi cation exams. Take Ontario as an example. Like most jurisdic-
tions in North America, Ontario follows the ABC standard of water-operator 
certifi cation, which involves four levels or classes: water treatment plants, water 
distribution, waste water treatment and waste water distribution. In Ontario there 
were 134 First Nations operated plants in 2004—71 were Class I, 54 were Class 
II, and 7 were Class III. Certifi cation requirements for these three classes of plants 
are as follows:
Class I: Grade 12; 1 year experience; 70% on exam
Class II: Grade 12; 3 years experience; 70% on exam; must have Class I 
licence
Class III: Grade 12 plus 2 years of additional education; 4 years 
experience (at least 2 years as operator in charge); must have a Class II 
licence
For many communities the educational requirements represent a major hurdle. 
Furthermore, the time necessary to become certifi ed, especially for the Class II 
and III plants, is so long that replacing a certifi ed operator who retires or leaves 
with another community member who is certifi ed to the appropriate level is not 
practical. Therefore, the whole notion of having trained First Nations operators, 
employed by their communities, is very much in question. Kashechewan provides 
defi nite proof of the weakness of this strategy.
Fortunately, the new Conservative government’s fi ve-point plan recognizes the 
problem, and proposes another approach based on the use of outside suppliers 
with certifi ed operators to oversee First Nations plants in situations where the 
First Nation cannot provide its own certifi ed operators.
•
•
•
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In conclusion, the approach to training and certifying operators, in each 
community, manifests many of the advantages and disadvantages predicted by 
the UNDP-based capacity building model. This approach has proven popular 
with both funding agencies and with First Nations and their organizations (tribal 
councils and technical organizations). Few would argue against more training and 
better qualifi ed operators. 
Nonetheless the disadvantages of pursuing this route outside the ambit of more 
systemic changes—such as the introduction of a regulatory system that would 
make the certifi cation of operators legally mandatory—are equally glaring. Thus 
it has taken over three years to realize that relying on First Nation members 
to be trained and certifi ed will not meet the goal of having certifi ed operators 
in every community in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, even with certifi ed 
operators in place, other critical elements are required to match the situation 
off-reserve: dedicated budgets and suffi cient funding for operations and mainte-
nance; political leaders aware of and committed to their responsibilities; legally 
enforceable standards; suffi cient information available to the public to track 
performance; and inspections with appropriate penalties.
It is to some of these elements that we now turn.
Organizational
Both Strategy 7 and Plan 5 have also focused on a number of organizational 
approaches. For example Strategy 7 included more funding for maintenance and, in 
some regions, stringent audit requirements. It also included better com missioning 
of plants and increased testing and inspection. Plants must undergo evaluations 
by third parties every three years, and funding for plants not meeting standards is 
a number one priority. In addition to these measures the new government’s Plan 
5 calls for specifi c remedial plans for First Nations communities with serious 
water issues.
Once again, the predictions of the UNDP-based model appear to be borne out. 
Without more systemic reforms, the appropriate incentives are not in place to 
realize signifi cant, sustainable change. For example, those First Nations which 
do the worst job of running their plants become the highest priority recipients 
for new funding. Furthermore, the more heavy-handed federal offi cials become 
in insisting that new funding for water-related initiatives be spent effectively by 
First Nations—through increased audits and inspections, for example—the more 
strained the relationship becomes between the partners in this joint endeavour to 
ensure safe water for First Nation communities.
So organizational capacity building efforts, even when combined with activi-
ties aimed at key individuals like water operators, are not suffi cient to deal with 
the safe water problems on-reserve. More systemic approaches—approaches that 
alter the incentives for both First Nations and their federal counterparts—are 
required. 
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System-wide
In relation to system changes, Strategy 7 did mention the introduction of standards, 
but stated this in very tepid terms. For example, it talked about developing a 
stronger, transparent inspection, reporting and compliance regime, and estab-
lishing national standards and protocols. But until the Kashechewan crisis, the 
federal government had demonstrated little appetite for a legislative approach for 
a variety of reasons—not the least of which, no doubt, is the political challenge of 
introducing legislative change affecting all First Nations across Canada. When the 
Kashechewan situation became well known, the Martin government announced 
their intentions to introduce legislated federal standards. And the new govern-
ment, as noted above, has continued this commitment.
But the World Bank experience, buttressed by other attempts at large-scale 
systemic change, suggests that any attempt to introduce such a regulatory system 
will be a long, arduous process. In the remainder of this section we canvass the 
reasons why this will indeed be the case. 
What’s Involved in the Regulation of Water?
To begin, the principle elements of a regulatory system for water quality would 
include the following:
Legislative base
Standards—source protection; water quality; system type; plant 
commissioning and certifi cation; operators; maintenance; lab 
certifi cation; testing; public disclosure; inspections; general standard
of care
Arms-length regulatory bodies (likely two—one for public health, a 
second with an environmental focus), inspection powers, enforcement 
options, and penalties
Emergency procedures
Public education
Several points require elaboration. First, regulation of water is a complicated 
business, highly scientifi c in nature, and one where there are multiple standards. 
Furthermore, water acts and their accompanying regulations are hundreds of pages 
in length, and call for some judgment in even identifying what standards exist. 
But regulation is also very much an art form. The issue comes down to managing 
risk and allocating scarce resources to keep the risk of something going wrong at 
acceptable levels. This requires considerable experience and years of practice. 
And it necessitates identifying and working with allies.
Finally, regulation can become politically charged. No one likes being regulated, 
especially if the reporting burden is high, and the possibility of fi nes, or even jail 
terms is real. 
•
•
•
•
•
1 Aboriginal Book 1.indb   154 12/4/06   2:23:29 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 3: Moving Forward, Making a Difference," in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
8  /  Building Governance Capacity  /  155
Why Legislation?
Legislation is the preferred base for such a system for a variety of reasons: 
Legislation forces needed clarity and transparency into the murkiness of 
unclear roles and accountabilities that characterize the current situation. 
Legislation is more likely to encourage sustainability. Courts do not look 
kindly on governments which establish regulatory regimes and then do 
not manage or resource them adequately. 
Legislation provides an easy out for politicians to deal with the politics 
of regulatory regimes. Faced with pressures to “let up,” politicians have a 
ready response: “I have no choice but to enforce the law.”
Inspection and enforcement powers can be draconian, and regulators 
need the certainty and force of legislation to do their jobs properly. For 
example, a provincial offi cer in Ontario has the authority to conduct an 
inspection without a warrant, or enter without a warrant any place that 
he or she reasonably believes contains part of a drinking water system. 
Along with broad powers of entry, they also have the power to take and 
remove documents, make inquiries, make excavations, and require tests 
to be performed. A provincial offi cer can also issue a compliance order 
requiring a person to repair, maintain, or operate a drinking-water system, 
water testing equipment or a laboratory in such a manner and with such 
equipment as may be specifi ed in the order, among other things.
Penalties are also signifi cant. Again, using Ontario as an example, 
enforcement of water quality can lead to convictions involving fi ve years 
in prison and $6 million in fi nes. These penalties must have a legislative 
base. 
A well-designed regulatory regime, as opposed to the contractual 
approach that has been utilized, would have a much wider variety 
of responses to water problems, responses varying from traditional 
enforcement techniques to negotiation, education and other voluntary 
approaches. 
What Should Be the Scope of the Legislation?
Should the government establish a combined regulatory system for water and 
waste water? The Sustainable Development Commissioner recommended a 
regulatory system for water only,9 but the experiences of North Battleford and 
Kashechewan suggest that any initiative should encompass waste water as well. 
Furthermore, there are practical reasons for a combined system because the same 
inspectors are involved. That said, federal and provincial/territorial leaders have 
already embarked on a Canada–wide exercise to harmonize waste water treatment 
standards. Thus, coordination is required between this exercise and any attempt to 
develop a safe water regime for First Nations.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Which Standards Should Be Adopted—Federal or Provincial?
Another issue involves using provincial versus federal standards. There are strong 
reasons to use provincial standards. The provinces already have education and 
certifi cation systems based on provincial standards for operator training and 
certifi cation. Furthermore, the construction industry will be familiar with these 
provincial standards. However, some provinces and territories do not yet have 
regulatory systems for water—for example, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and the Yukon. So federal standards or other provincial standards will 
be necessary for these jurisdictions.
What Should Be the Role of the Federal Partners—INAC, Health 
Canada and Environment Canada?
The role of federal departments in regulation of water is an issue. Federal depart-
ments, such as INAC, Health Canada and Environment Canada, should not be 
regulators. In some instances, they may actually be the regulatees. Do federal 
departments provide enough funds? Are they doing a good job when they approve 
plant designs, and so on? Regulators should pose these and other questions to the 
federal departments. 
The issue of adequate funding for First Nations will be a major obstacle to 
overcome. It will not be tenable for First Nations leaders to assume the same 
liabilities as their non-Aboriginal counterparts in local governments across 
Canada, and yet not have some reasonable guarantee of adequate funding. This 
will be, indeed, a tough nut to crack. 
Who Should Be the Regulatory Authority? 
There are three options: a new federal authority, existing provincial authorities or 
some newly established First Nations authority. The obvious answer is to build 
on the provincial experience and have provincial authorities acting as agents of 
the federal government. Furthermore, within each provincial regulatory authority, 
there could be units specifi cally established for First Nations. All of this would 
take considerable negotiation, involving First Nations and the other two levels 
of government in each province and territory. And the issues will not be easy, 
funding being a key obstacle to overcome. Also, there is still the question of what 
to do in provinces without existing regulatory regimes.
How to Bridge this New Regime to Self-government?
Implementing regulatory systems for potable water involve questions about the 
roles of the different levels of government, but for First Nations, the issue is also 
about building an important bridge to self-government. An ideal situation, as noted 
above, would involve a negotiated agreement with each province to establish 
a special inspection and enforcement unit to be staffed primarily by personnel 
recruited from First Nations. This would be more acceptable to First Nations 
communities in administering what is essentially a provincial regime. Also, at 
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some point in the future, the First Nation unit could become part of some First 
Nation government and would bring with it the experience, skills and contacts 
that would otherwise take years to build.
What about Existing Self-government Agreements?
Unfortunately, existing self-government agreements, such as those involving 
Yukon, Cree-Naskapi and Nisga’a First Nations and the First Nations Lands 
Management Act, have not addressed the issue of potable water well.10 Often, 
these agreements provide First Nations with the jurisdiction to deal with potable 
water but do not ensure that they have a fully functioning regulatory regime. 
Furthermore, the large majority of agreements do not provide an appropriate 
governmental structure for an effective regulatory system for potable water. In 
essence the self-governing entities would both operate water systems and regulate 
themselves. These agreements need to be reviewed, and future agreements should 
be developed with greater attention to the regulatory function.
What about Powers and Penalties?
Inspection powers and penalties comprise yet another area of potential concern. 
Post Walkerton, provincial penalties have stiffened considerably, and some 
adjustments may be necessary in the First Nations context. Furthermore, there 
may ways to develop sanctions more in keeping with First Nations culture than 
simply reverting to fi nes and jail terms.
What Should Happen to Existing Plants that Don’t Meet 
Standards?
Another issue involves the relationship of regulation to plant conditions and 
operators. Many plants are not up to standard at present, and will require signifi -
cant investments to upgrade them. These plants might require a transition stage.
Looking toward the future, there is an additional dilemma facing federal 
funders, assuming the federal legislation adopts provincial standards, and it is 
this: the regulation of water is a dynamic area of public policy with ever-evolving 
regulatory standards. To meet new standards will likely cost money. And yet, both 
federal and First Nations governments would not be in control of the development 
or adoption of these standards. This is not a position in which governments like 
to fi nd themselves.
What about Other Regulatory Voids Affecting First Nations 
Communities?
Any solution for setting up a regulatory system for clean potable water on reserves 
could provide some routes to deal with other environmental and health-related 
voids.11 These are considerable:
Environmental protection relating to water and land (solid waste 
recycling, contaminated sites, hazardous waste, nutrients, pesticides)
•
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Resource management (land use, water use, forestry, fi sh, wildlife, 
agriculture, minerals, aggregates)
Environmental assessment
Health, safety, and transportation (hazardous substances, fi re safety, spill 
responses, dangerous goods)
To avoid dealing with these voids implies health and environmental condi-
tions on reserves well below those found in other Canadian communities. Further-
more, the road to self-government will be a long, rocky one. It is asking a lot for 
new self-governing entities to address the enormity of the challenges these voids 
present. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined a model that outlines three possible strategies 
for building governance capacity: individual, organizational and system-wide. We 
have argued that there is a program bias among funders of capacity building activi-
ties towards individual strategies. Organizational and system-wide strategies tend 
to be costly, risky, longer-term, and dependent on political commitments. Also, 
the roles of funding agencies are more uncertain in these latter approaches.
It is clear from the potable water case study we presented that a reliance on 
individual or even organizational strategies will not suffi ce to deal adequately 
with the problems facing First Nations in providing this basic necessity to their 
citizens. Furthermore, communities in the greatest need of reform for their water 
systems are often the least likely to be equipped to lead such reforms. 
So putting in place a regulatory system akin to that found in non-Aboriginal 
communities across Canada is clearly the way to proceed. But having said this, 
the diffi culties of addressing the array of issues in implementing such a systemic 
change should not be underestimated. Indeed, this may well be a fi ve-to-ten-year 
exercise, involving signifi cant changes to existing incentives. Readers may recall 
television clips of the Chief of the Kashechewan First Nation returning to a hero’s 
welcome to his community after negotiating a deal with Ottawa for signifi cant 
housing and other upgrades to his community. Had the Chief been a mayor of an 
adjacent non-Aboriginal community, rather than being seen as a hero, he and his 
fellow councillors would have been subject to signifi cant fi nes and even jail terms 
for allowing E.coli into their community’s drinking water.
With so much at stake, and with the wide range of diffi cult issues to address, the 
question becomes whether there will be signifi cant political will on the part of all 
parties—First Nation, federal, and provincial/territorial—to stay the course. For 
the sake of some of Canada’s poorest communities and most vulnerable citizens, 
let’s hope the answer is yes. 
•
•
•
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